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Chapter 12: Racist movements, the far right and mainstreaming 
Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter 
 
We have recently witnessed a resurgence and mainstreaming of the far right across much of the 
west, but also in countries like Brazil. In the UK, we have seen the deep influence of UKIP on 
mainstream politics, the street activism of the English Defence League (EDL) and Britain First, 
and wider support for anti- immigrant and anti-Muslim politics and their role in the Brexit 
victory. In the US, we have witnessed the election of Trump, whose campaign and nativist, anti-
immigrant and anti-Muslim policies have been endorsed and supported by the white nationalist 
alt-right and wider racist extreme right, including David Duke, the Ku Klux Klan and Stormfront. 
There have also been strong electoral performances in France by the Front National, Alternative 
für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, Dansk Folkeparti (DF) in Denmark and Jobbik in Hungary, 
while Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in Austria, Lega in Italy and Fiddesz in Hungary 
entered government as coalition partners. 
Beyond parties, new anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim protest movements such as the 
Generation Identity, the EDL and PEGIDA have developed in Europe. These movements often 
have ties with parties, but provide different avenues for recruitment and allow for more radical 
approaches, which could prove alienating to voters for parties involved a more mainstream 
strategy. In addition, there has also been a rise in hate crimes in many of these contexts. This all 
occurs in liberal democracies that have, since the Second World War, seen themselves as having 
defeated and expunged fascism, and self-righteously ‘post-racial’. That is not to say that far right 
activity had disappeared, but that in many cases the far right came to be seen as both an 
unacceptable remnant of the illiberal pre-war period and embodiment of racism in the post-race 
context. 
As  Eduardo  Bonilla-Silva  and  Victor  Ray  (2015)  pointed  out,  this  is  not  surprising  as 
racism is commonly thought of today as ‘individual-level animosity or hatred towards people of 
colour’, and associated primarily with its most explicit and historical manifestations or 
representations, such as ‘Klan rallies or overt racial behaviour like hanging a noose from a tree’ 
(Bonilla-Silva with Ray 2015: 59). This perspective or take on racism not only conveniently misses 
ongoing structural and institutional racism and racial inequality that were not defeated with the 
Nazis or the Klan (before the latter’s many revivals), but the discursive reconstruction of the far 
right in ways that displaced or concealed their racism under a liberal veneer. Following from this, 
it is important to note that despite the far right being widely seen as the form in which racism 
takes place in the post-war and post-race context, research and scholarship on what we refer to 
as ‘racist movements’, tends to occur in political science and looks at them as part of the 
‘extreme’, ‘far’, ‘radical’ or ‘populist’ right, as opposed to racism proper. Racism and xenophobia 
are often viewed as characteristics in a terminological frame- work or taxonomy, as opposed to 
constitutive. The focus of such work tends to be where they sit on the political spectrum. 
Furthermore, in such studies, they are often constructed as a threat to post-war liberal 
democracy rather than racialised people who they target, as if liberal democracy was a 
safeguard in itself rather than a potential enabler of racist practices. While this is a specific 
analytic formulation and approach, as opposed to the traditional survey or overview, we believe 
it is necessary to understand the contemporary landscape of racist movements, how they 
emerged in particular forms, including the denial of racism and white victim narratives, and their 
mainstreaming. 
In this chapter, we examine contemporary racist movements. In the first section, we look at 
what and who ‘racist movements’ are. In the second section, we look at a range of approaches 
to defining and researching racist movements, often under other labels which can sometimes 
sideline focus and analysis of racism. In Section 3, we look at the concept and position of racist 
movements in the post-racial era, where they stand in for racism itself. Finally, in the fourth 
which challenges concepts such as ‘extremist’ and the function of racist movements as the 
embodiment of racism. 
 
Racist movements 
When considering ‘racist movements’, one’s thoughts often turn to a series of historical and con- 
temporary notables: The Ku Klux Klan, alt-right, Nazis, Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists,  
the  National  Front,  British  National  Party (BNP), EDL,  Britain  First, PEGIDA, Front National, 
Lega and others. Yet, when the phenomenon is studied, it is often labelled instead ‘extreme’, 
‘far’ or ‘radical’ right, and more recently and perhaps most incorrectly ‘populism’, with racism 
de-emphasised or even removed. According to Kathleen Blee (2013), 
Racist  movements  are  organized,  collective  efforts  to  create,  preserve,  or  extend 
racial  hierarchies  of  power  and  privilege.  Such  movements  explicitly  espouse  the 
ideologies  of  white  supremacism  and/or  anti-Semitism  (anti-Judaism  or  hatred  of 
Muslims  or  Arabs)  that  were  consolidated  in  the  Western  world  in  the  
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
While this is a good starting point, it is worth noting here that the point of reference is now 
discarded historical ideas. Moreover, the historical roots of such ideas do not limit their 
continuing transmission, legacy and structural impact, and the representation of the far right as 
their contemporary manifestation is a construction that distracts from that legacy, as well as 
systemic and liberal racism. 
Although this is far from exhaustive, the types of organisations we define as racist movements 
include political parties, social movements (protest and street activists), violent and paramilitary, 
media and intellectual platforms. It may also be the case that there is overlap or duel functions 
and repertoires, such as in the cases of the BNP and Britain First which have engaged in street 
activism and elections, with the latter also engaging in paramilitary train- ing and harassment 
during street protests. There are also larger networks and subcultures, and linked to these, 
(new) media platforms, such as The Daily Stormer, The Right Stuff and Gab, that allow 
movements, affiliated and non-affiliated individuals to participate and engage. 
Within these formations are specific ideological types including fascists and neo-Nazis, white 
supremacists, white separatists, neo-confederates, Identitarians, anti-Muslims, anti- immigrants 
and combinations of these. These also contain diverse variations, such as a white supremacy or 
fascism founded upon specific theologies or ideologies, such as Christian Identity. They may also 
be regionalist, nationalist (including separatist) and/or imperialist in their identity, location or 
political orientation, and system or state supportive and hegemonic or oppositional and counter-
hegemonic, although they are typically hegemonic in terms of race even when claiming, for 
example, that whites are marginalised and victimised. 
It is also important to recognise the role of the individual and the ways in which racism within 
society allows and produces individualisation in cases of white extremism. In recent years, the  
‘lone  wolf’  trope  has  become  increasingly  popular  to  describe  extreme  right attacks, 
leading to some commentators lamenting on the double standards within analyses of terrorism. 
Attacks seemingly conducted in the name of Islam are usually treated as terrorist in nature, both 
by politicians and the media, while extreme right attacks, even those with clear and avowedly 
terrorist intent, have been portrayed as the acts of mad or bad individuals or aberrations.  Yet, 
research  shows  that  more  often  than  not  the  individual  is  linked  to a movement or 
radicalised by one. This was made particularly obvious in the wake of the attack conducted by 
Anders Breivik on 22 July 2011 when he bombed a government building in Oslo, killing eight 
people, and committed a gun attack on a youth Labour Party gathering on Utøya, killing 69. He 
was widely described as a ‘lone wolf’, despite having been part of Norway’s powerful far right 
Progress Party for a number of years. A similar kind of individualisation took place in the case of 
Thomas Mair who murdered UK Labour MP Jo Cox  in  Birstall  at  the  height  of  the  EU  
Referendum  campaign.  Despite  clear  links  to a number of organisations and their 
programmes and ideologies, Mair was widely described as a mentally unstable loner by UKIP and 
Leave.EU leader Nigel Farage (‘one man with ser ious mental health issues’); Spiked!’s Brendan 
O’Neill (‘warped killer’); and The  Daily  Mail (‘loner’ seeking counselling) (Winter 2017). 
The relationship between the extreme right, individualisation and racial privilege come 
together in the  case  of  Timothy  McVeigh  who  bombed  the  Murrah  Federal  Building  in 
Oklahoma City on 19 April 1995, killing 168. In the Time magazine issue on the bombing, the 
cover image was of McVeigh’s mugshot with the headline ‘The Face of Terror’. In the related 
article, Elizabeth Gleick argued that ‘a sense of guilty introspection swept the country when the 
FBI released the sketches of the suspects, distinctly Caucasian John Does one and two’. Mike Hill 
argued that more than guilt and introspection, the image and headline were terrifying to Time’s 
implied white readers because they rendered whiteness distinct or particular, as opposed to 
universal, as it became directly implicated in the terror (Hill 1997). Yet, this was wishful thinking. 
The hegemonic universalism that renders whiteness invisible and  non-racialised  (to  itself)  is  
not  challenged  by  the  act  of  an  individual  (or  even a suspicious pattern of individuals, who 
happen to be aligned with a movement), because the  opposite  of  white  universalism  is  not  
particularism,  but  individualism  (Winter  2010). This occurred despite his links to the wider 
anti-government extreme right that had been active throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Defining and researching racist movements 
While  we  have  Blee’s  definition  of  ‘racist  movements’,  as  noted,  within  the  literature 
terms such as extreme, far and radical right have been used over the years, at times inter- 
changeably, to describe a myriad of movements and parties that have racist identities and hold 
racist ideologies, from more mimetic iterations of fascism and Nazism to nationalist parties with 
no ties to historical ideologies. There is a lack of consensus, not only on the appropriate 
terminology, but also on which features should be used to define such a disparate ideological 
family, and racisms are typically only part of the picture. According to Cas Mudde in 2007: 
Without claiming to be exhaustive, titles of (comparative) books and articles in various 
languages on the topic include terms like extreme right, far right, radical right, right, 
radical right-wing populism, right-wing populism, national populism, new populism, 
neopopulism, exclusionary populism, populist nationalism, ethno-nationalism, anti- 
immigrant, nativism, racism, racist extremism, fascism, neofascism, postfascism, 
reaction- ary tribalism, integralism, antipartyism. The terminology chaos is not the 
result of fundamental difference of opinion over the correct definition; rather, it is 
largely the consequence of a lack of clear definition. 
The term used depends on a variety of factors, including context, politics (of the movement and 
scholar) and discipline. Literature on these comes primarily from Political Science and Politics, 
and includes country and movement case studies, electoral analysis, organisation analysis, 
ideological (type) analysis, as well as work on (and long-standing debates about) definitions 
themselves. 
Throughout the 1990s and until the late 2000s, the term extreme right was probably the most 
commonly used to describe the resurgence of parties such as the Front National or the FPÖ. 
Mudde (1997) has listed at least fifty-eight possible characteristics which identify and define the 
extreme right, including racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, anti-communism, nationalism, 
patriotism, libertarianism or authoritarianism, paramilitarism, violence, terrorism and 
conspiracism. Such taxonomic definitions allow for the identification and inclusion of new 
phenomena, although they are typically based on manifestations in different historical, political 
and geographical contexts. Where new characteristics are encountered these can be included 
and the category can be expanded. As such, taxonomic definitions can be either analytically 
reductionist in their application, historically presentist in their use or apply to characteristics that 
exist across the political spectrum, including the mainstream at times. It should also be noted 
that there was also an uptake in uses of and scholarship on ‘fascism’ (and varieties thereof) 
applied to contemporary movements at the same time, highlighting the shadow cast by Nazism 
on the recognition and analysis of later movements and parties (see Griffin 1993, 1995). 
The use of the term extreme right changed with the seminal work carried by Mudde on the 
populist radical right in the mid-2000s, which he defined as having three main characteristics: 
nativism, authoritarianism and populism. More recently, we have also witnessed the revival (and 
hype) of the term populism in response to Brexit, Trump and so-called radical right populist 
parties in Europe (Glynos and Mondon 2016). We have also seen the rise of new terminology, 
such as the alt-right, coined by leader Richard Spencer, which has not only added to the number 
of terms used, but led to debates over the use of movement self- definition by the media, 
researchers and analysts, particularly as this one conceals the movement’s extremism, racism, 
white supremacism/white nationalism and fascism under the more acceptable and edgy 
‘alt’/alternative moniker. Moreover, it is also a looser network of activists than traditional  
movements,  and  operates  on  diverse  online  and  offline  platforms.  In a sense though, these 
characteristics may also be key to understanding media interest and the movement’s success 
mainstreaming racist extreme right ideas (Winter 2019). 
These issues are complicated further by attempts to position these parties and movements on 
the political spatial spectrum, and what status their defining characteristics, such as racism, have 
in contemporary society. For example, Minkenberg (1997: 84–85) argues that these parties and 
movements ‘are “extreme” not in terms of being against or outside the existing constitutional 
order but in terms of being extreme within it’. They abide by ‘a belief system that does not share  
the values of the political order within which  it operates’. Martin Durham (2000: xii) has 
attempted to establish clear taxonomic definitions and boundaries between the mainstream, 
extreme, far and radical right. Those committed to white supremacy and anti-Semitism are best 
defined as extreme right, while non-racist conspiracists are best defined as radical right. Where 
there is ambiguity, indecision or overlap, Durham makes use of the term far right. 
In our definition and approach, we foreground racism and have decided to reserve the use the 
term extreme right for those movements and activists who express illiberal articulations of 
racism and may engage in violence. We use the term far right to describe movements and 
parties that espouse a racist ideology, but do so in an indirect, coded or even covert manner, by 
focusing notably on culture and/or occupying the space between  illiberal and liberal racisms, 
between the extreme and the mainstream. This can be witnessed in what we call the 
reconstructed far right. Such movements and parties may challenge mainstream parties and be 
more explicit in their ideologies and agendas, but these differences are exaggerated by the 
mainstream to establish its liberal self-image and hegemony. 
If anything,  all  of  this  tells  us  that  how  we  understand  and  define  such  phenomena is 
not fixed across different historical and political contexts and disciplines. These differences can 
reflect changes  to the movements  in  question, their relationship to the main- stream  or  
centre,  what  is  acceptable  political  discourse,  and  the  function  of  such terminology  (or  the  
scholars’  analysis  or  objectives).  It  is  worth  noting  here  that  the term ‘radical right’ was 
coined by Seymour Martin Lipset (1955), to describe movements, organisations and actors, 
including the Ku Klux Klan, John Birch Society and McCarthy- ism,  that  sought  ‘far-reaching  
changes  in  American  institutions’,  rejecting  tolerance, establishment  conservatism  and  
democratic  procedures,  such  as  lobbying  and  the  ballot box,  in  favour  of  agitation  and  
practices  which  threatened  ‘to  undermine  the  social fabric  of  democratic  politics’.  While  
Lipset  identified  the  rejection  of  tolerance  as a  characteristic,  the  conceptualisation  can  be  
seen  as  a  normative  defence  of  the  main- stream liberal democratic system and order, which 
was racist and anti-communist, and its accepted  procedures,  which  were  also  used  to  
express  and  maintain  these.  Crucially, these  new  movements,  and  associated  typologies,  
coincided  with  the  emergence  of  the post-war liberal order, the second phase of the Cold  
War (both following the defeat of the Nazis) and the American battle over desegregation and 
civil rights. Paul Hainsworth’s framing of his book The  Politics  of  the  Extreme  Right:  From  the  
Margins  to  the  Mainstream, a central concern of the early 2000s literature, is telling here: 
historians and political commentators will look back upon a century of extremism, in 
which fascism and intolerance figured prominently, and to devastating effect. Total 
war, Holocaust, ethnic cleansing and scapegoating of ‘the Other’ have marked the past 
hundred years of Western civilization. The mid-point of the century, of course, 
witnessed the defeat of Nazi and fascist forces and signalled – in the West – the victory 
of liberal democratic ideas, rooted in pluralism, multi-partyism, a renewed assertion of 
dignity of the individual and a respect for human rights (Hainsworth 2000: 1). 
While fascism and Nazism cast a shadow over the definitions and analysis, and for Lipset and 
Raab The  Politics  of  Unreason:  Right  Wing  Extremism  in  America,  1790–1970  (1970), 
desegregation and civil rights provide the context, it is notable that racism is not foregrounded 
or prioritised in work on the extreme, far or radical right. This is partly because of the dominance 
of political scientists working on the topic. There is also work in other disciplines that addresses 
race  and  racism  more  prominently,  particularly  in  Sociology,  Social  Psychology, Criminology,  
History,  Anthropology  and  Politics.  The terms  used  for  the  movements  in question  include  
racist  movements,  hate  groups,  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  extreme  and  far right.  Notable  
examples  include  Michael  Billig’s  Fascists:  A  Social  Psychological  View  of  the National  Front  
(1979), Raphael Ezekiel’s The  Racist  Mind:  Portraits  of  American  Neo-Nazis  and Klansmen  
(1996),  Jessie  Daniels’  White  Lies:  Race,  Class,  Gender,  and  Sexuality  in  White Supremacist  
Discourse  (1997), Jeffrey Kaplan and Tore Bjorgo’s edited collection Nation  and Race:  The  
Developing  Euro-American  Racist  Subculture  (1998), Kathleen Blee’s Inside  Organized Racism:  
Women  in  the  Hate  Movement  (2002) and more recent Understanding  Racist  Activism: 
Theory,  Methods,  and  Research  (2018),  and  Sindre  Bangstad’s  Anders  Breivik  and  the  Rise  
of Islamophobia  (2014).  There are also studies of  movements,  that  focus  more  on  racism,  in 
terms  of  a  range  of  sub-themes  and  issues,  utilising  a  range  of  methods  and  theoretical 
approaches.  A  non-exhaustive  list  with  a  small  selection  of  examples  includes:  activism 
(Dobratz  and  Shanks-Meile  2000;  Klandermans  and  Mayer  2006;  Simi  and  Futrell  2015); 
gender  (Blee  2002;  Daniels  1997;  Ferber  1998;  Sanders-McDonagh  2018);  online  (Back, 
Keith and Solomos 1998; Daniels 2009; Perry and Scrivens 2016; Winter 2019); history (Berlet 
and Lyons 2000; Chalmers 1965; Copsey and Richardson 2015; Copsey and Worley 2018; Macklin 
2007; Webb 2010; Winter 2018); class (Rhodes 2011; Rydgren 2012); popular culture (King and 
Leonard 2014; Miller-Idriss 2017); terrorism and violence (Adamczyk, Gruenewald, Chermak and 
Freilich 2014; Winter 2010, 2018); mainstreaming (Mondon 2013; Winter 2017, 2019), and 
specific country-based cases (e.g. Mondon 2014 on France); and a wealth of work on the alt-
right in the current context (Hawley 2017; Neiwert 2017; Wendling 2018). There is also work 
(including amongst  these examples) that focus  on movements and organisations or individuals, 
particular contexts or comparative analysis, while some are critical analyses and others more 
practical problem solving in function (e.g. deradicalisation, security and policing). There is also 
some work in the field of race and racism studies, that addresses racist movements, but they are 
positioned as a minor aspect or part of the landscape of contemporary racism that is largely 
defined and determined by structural and institutional forms (e.g. Anderson 2016; Bonilla-Silva 
2001; Omi and Winant 1994; Solomos 2003; Wieviorka 1995) This is something that needs to be 





Racist movements and the post-racial 
Just like the fact that when racist movements are studied, their racism can be de-emphasised, in 
some cases when they are the focus of study or when racism is discussed in the media and wider 
society, ironically, such racist movements come to stand in for and embody racism itself. We can 
see this in past and current panics about the far right bringing racism back into the mainstream, 
or the denial of systemic and everyday racism that is based on a comparison to ‘real’ racism from 
the past or in extreme forms, which we call illiberal. Often, these are based on the notion that 
racism has been defeated, because the Nazis or the Klan have, and paradoxically, that mimetic 
acts are the only remaining forms, thus foreclosing on recognition of systemic and contemporary 
mainstream forms and manifestations. 
Examples of this could be seen particularly in responses to Obama’s election. In one editorial 
image,  ‘Obama and resigned KKK member’,  by Riber Hansson (2008), Obama is  shown walking 
up the White House passing a Klansman looking downcast and leaning on his cross. Of the 
election, Richard Cohen (2008), of the Washington  Post, wrote ‘it is not just that he is post-
racial; so is the nation he is generationally primed to lead’, and quoting Lyndon John- son, ‘we 
have overcome’. The image used is of police attacking voting rights marchers at the  Edmund  
Pettus  Bridge,  which  was  still  named  after  the  former  Senator  and  Grand Dragon of the 
Alabama Klan, in Selma on ‘Bloody Sunday’, 7 March 1965. 
In the UK, following the post-Brexit rise in hate crimes, Brendan O’Neill (2016), the editor of far 
right libertarian Spiked! argued in The Spectator: 
there is a great disparity between the handwringing over hate crime and what Britain is 
actually like. The open racism even I can remember in the 1980s has all but vanished … 
The likes of the BNP and EDL have withered due to lack of interest. 
UKIP founder and former leader Nigel Farage (2016) claimed that: 
I destroyed the British National Party – we had a far right party in this country who 
genuinely were anti-Jew, anti-Black, all of those things, and I came along, and said to 
their voters, if you’re holding your nose and voting for this party as a protest, don’t. 
Come and vote for me – I’m not against anybody, I just want us to start put- ting British 
people first, and I, almost single-handedly, destroyed the far right in Brit- ish politics. 
This occurred despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that UKIP is widely seen as the inheritor of 
the BNP’s politics and a mainstreaming version, something we will return to in the section on 
discursive reconstruction. In France, Jean-Marie Le Pen was for a long time used as a scarecrow, 
and regularly described as the ‘filthy beast’ (la bête immonde), a direct reference to Nazism and 
fascism. This in turn facilitated the ignorance of racism within mainstream politics  in  France,  
particularly  expressed  towards  Muslim  communities,  but  also  allowed Marine Le Pen to pitch 
herself as moderate compared to her father, while being literally the heir of the old order. 
It is often an effect or product of historical narratives that celebrate victory over historical 
enemies. This can be seen in post-war celebrations of the defeat of Nazism across the liberal 
democratic west, as well as more specifically in the more recent case of Winston Churchill, 
whose racism is defended with recourse to both being a man of his time and having defeated 
the Nazis (no comment on Empire and colonial racism which continued) (Burrows 2018; Sky 
News 2019). This narrative would be replayed for all of Britain following the defeat of post-war 
fascists such as the National Front in the 1980s and the BNP in early 2000s, as the O’Neill  
quotation  illustrated.  Whereas  in  the  US,  the  ability  to  conflate  racism  and  the extreme 
(as well as far) right separates them both from the mainstream, and sees them as defeated, a 
discursive construction that furnishes the post-racial narrative and mythology that accompanied 
Obama’s election was the product of a series of developments in the 1960s. These  were  the  
FBI  COINTELPRO  White  Hate  Groups  Programme  from  1964  and HUAC hearings into the 
Activities of the Ku Klux Klan Organization from 1965, which condemned the group as terrorists 
and un-American, which greatly diminished the organisation just as Civil Rights and Voting Rights 
had passed (Winter 2018), paving the way for post-race. 
The notion that racism is defined by the extreme or far right is part of the construction of what 
we term ‘illiberal racism’. This is racism defined by extreme and historical movements, such as 
Nazism, the Klan or National Front, as well as corresponding beliefs and ideologies such as 
biological racism, white supremacy and blood and soil nationalism, and practices such as slavery, 
colonialism, and segregation, which were once part of the mainstream, but have been cast out 
as illiberal and unacceptable in the liberal post-war and post-civil rights eras. This is evident 
when Hainsworth refers to Nazism in his analysis of the mainstreaming of the extreme right and 
Blee defines racist movements in terms of racist ideologies of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Yet, this ignores systemic racism and inequality in favour of the illusion (and defence) 
of colourblindness and perpetuation of colourblind or liberal racism. 
This echoes Bonilla-Silva’s ‘racism without racists’ (2006), and particularly, his two frames of 
abstract liberalism and cultural racism. The former is ‘an abstract manner to explain racial 
matters’ and even celebrate racial progress (as a liberal achievement): with each person being 
now  equal  in  rights  and  opportunity,  proof  of  which  is  based  on  individual  achievement 
universalised, white people can righteously claim that barriers have been lifted and the onus in 
on the (liberal) individual to make their own life, ignoring thus the structural and systemic racial 
inequalities still in place. 
According to Tim Wise, commenting on this liberal post-racial frame being used in reference to  
Obama,  the  election  did  not  signify  the  death  of  racism,  but  the  usurpation  of ‘Racism 
1.0,’  the ‘old-fashioned bigotry …  that has long marked the nation’s history: the kind that, in its 
most extreme moments has precipitated racist murder, lynching, and terror’ (illiberal racism in 
our terms) by ‘Racism 2.0.’ (Wise 2009: 26). That is, ‘enlightened exceptionalism a form that 
allows for and even celebrates the achievements of individual persons of color’ (abstract 
liberalism in Bonilla-Silva’s terms and liberal racism in ours). Yet, as Wise points out supports, 
‘Racism 1.0’ persists and ‘animates hate groups and hate crimes’ (Wise 2009: 26), something we 
saw in the racist extreme and far right backlash to Obama’s election and resurgence under 
Trump. 
The second frame, cultural racism, shifts the focus from race to culture (and religion in the case 
of Muslims) and blame that for the inferior standing of minorities (see also Balibar and  
Wallerstein  1997;  Barker  1982).  We  see  this  in  movements  and  discourses  that  deny their 
racism and articulate it through liberal causes, such as women’s rights, LGBTQ+ rights, free 
speech and democracy (Mondon and Winter 2017a), which has been central to what we term 
‘discursive reconstruction’ and one of the keys to mainstreaming. 
 
Discursive reconstruction, the liberal turn and mainstreaming 
If the war marked a shift in how racism was perceived, so too did the social upheaval of the 
1960s and 1970s. The extreme right would play the functional role of illiberal scarecrow for the 
liberal mainstream to distract from the liberal racism. While some embraced this extremism, 
others attempted to reshape their discourse and strategy to adapt to their new context in a 
more counter-hegemonic fashion. In the post-war period, the Klan very much played the 
functional boogieman in the US. Yet, what is often ignored is just how embedded in the 
mainstream they were. While the American far and extreme right moved from the mainstream 
to the more extreme in the post-civil rights era, abandoning the state for political insurgency, 
white supremacy for white separatism, Protestantism for Christian Identity and Odinism and the 
Klan for more overtly fascist movements such as Aryan Nations and National Alliance, in Europe 
the picture would be different (at least until the Trump era and emergence of the alt-right). 
The response to the post-war and post-1960s consensus involved a process of discursive 
reconstruction to ensure electoral credibility. While the process has been uneven and has very 
much depended on context, some trends have become common in the reshaping of extreme 
right politics into more moderate far right politics. The impetus towards discursive 
reconstruction really took shape in the 1980s, when groups of intellectuals devised ways for the 
extreme right to escape the position it had been forced in after the defeat of fascism in the 
Second World War. The illiberal nature of extreme right discourse, based on biological racism 
and fascist nostalgia, was further marginalised by the rise of progressive counter-movements in 
the 1960s based on second-wave feminist, civil rights, anti-colonial and anti-racist ideas. As 
extreme right support reached a nadir and as conservative mainstream parties on the right were 
forced to give way to a number of progressive measures, it became necessary for the more 
strategically-minded actors on the right-wing fringe of politics to seek a way out of the margins 
without diluting their ideological roots. For this to be possible, the extreme right needed to 
engage in a process of discursive reconstruction which would provide it with a way into the 
mainstream by separating it from the more illiberal forms of right-wing politics. This manifested 
in their discursive rejection of the extreme right, although links between both would remain 
alive, albeit concealed. Biological racism was increasingly replaced by the cultural racism 
referred to by Bonilla-Silva, mostly targeted against Muslim communities, and populism became 
central to their discourse. 
In  France,  this  would  see  the  Front  National  (see  amongst  others,  Crépon,  Dézé  and 
Mayer 2015; Mondon 2013, 2014) initiated by neo-fascist Ordre Nouveau in 1972 and led by  
fascist,  anti-Semite  Jean-Marie  Le  Pen,  their  first  president,  move  away  from  crude racism, 
and instead focus on ‘culture’  and Islam as a convenient scapegoat. This would be something 
which proved particularly effective in France where the concept of laïcité (secular- ism) had 
already turned into a reactionary tool to push racist agendas (Mondon 2015). In the 21st 
century, and even more so under the new leadership of Marine Le Pen, who embraced liberal 
tropes of free speech and women’s rights, as well as philosemitism, against Muslims and the 
illiberal fascism of her father’s party. 
In the UK, the story was again different. Pre-war, the extreme right was represented by Oswald  
Mosley’s  British  Union  of  Fascists  and  post-war  by  the  National  Front.  Yet,  the place  
occupied  by  the  nation  as  the  last  standing  bulwark  against  Nazism  and  fascism  in the 
Second World War has given a particular twist to the way the extreme and far right have 
organised This was made particularly clear when Nick Griffin tried to use Spitfires in one of his 
BNP campaign posters, and faced near universal condemnation as he was automatically linked to 
the enemy of this national emblem of the fight against the Nazis. The BNP,  formed  in  1982,  
proved  similarly  unsuccessful  at  shedding  its  extreme  right  image decisively despite a few 
breakthroughs in the 2000s. It was UKIP’s lack of ties to the traditional extreme right and 
Euroscepticism as opposed to open racism that has allowed sup- porters of a more 
reconstructed approach. 
Of particular interest is the way UKIP followed an almost inverted trajectory to that of the FN. 
Farage’s UKIP moved beyond traditional Euroscepticism, found in large swathes of the 
Conservative party, adding a more targeted fear of the other in the form of Brussels, immigrants 
and Islam. At the same time, the UK experienced the EDL, whose founder Stephen Yaxley-
Lennon (a.k.a. Tommy Robinson) styled the organisation as both a voice of the working class and 
champion of free speech, women’s and LGBTQ+ rights against Islam and Muslims. As the climate 
became increasingly polarised and far right (and to a lesser extent more extreme right) issues 
mainstreamed, what Robinson would say in the late 2010s was no longer as shocking to elite 
discourse, as when he said it a decade prior from the confines of the extreme right. In fact, like 
Farage, Robinson was feted by the media and given a frequent platform by the BBC and other 
outlets (Mondon and Winter 2017b). 
Many books and articles have focused on the ways the discourse of parties and movements 
once considered toxic has evolved or been adapted: ‘From the margins to the mainstream’ has 
become  a  popular  refrain  since the early  2000s  (see for  example Akkerman, de Lange  and 
Rooduijn 2016; Hainsworth 2000). Recent events such as Brexit, Trump’s election, and the strong 
performance of a number of far-right parties across Europe have made it an ever more debated 
issue. This was compounded by a rise in everyday racism and hate crimes, extreme and far right 
marches and rallies, and mainstream establishment parties legitimising the anti- immigrant and 
anti-Islam discourse.  (see Mondon and Winter 2019). We argue that main- streaming is indeed 
very much a two-way process and that it cannot take place with the far right as sole  agent  (e.g.  
merely moderating):  no  matter  how  hard  a  far  right party  tries  to reform itself, if the 
broader political system is not open to welcoming it and/or its ideas, it is bound to remain at the 
margins. The breakthrough of far-right politics has thus necessitated the help of mainstream 
actors such as politicians of course, but also the media and academics to legitimise, if not their 
cause, their presence in the political debate. A sense of crisis and urgency is essential for far-
right ideas to make their way into the mainstream as they require a derogation from the current 
(and contingent) norms. This is almost always related to the perceived pressure created by the 
other, whether they are internal (and even citizens at times such as Muslims, Jews or 
second/third-generation immigrants) or external (refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants). While 
we are now seeing fascists marching, it is worth noting that the soft liberal racism, which had 
once denounced the illiberal racism or the far right, also allowed them back in the mainstream 
through media platforming (e.g. Richard Spencer and Tommy Robinson), free speech, 
moderation, populist hype and more. 
In the UK, we have seen the normalisation of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim ideas and 
discourses within the mainstream in ways that legitimise and even mainstream the ideas of the 
far right, as well as embolden them. Sometimes this is done by mainstream political parties to 
fend off the alleged threat by the far right (such as the BNP after their electoral success in the 
early 2000s), but other times this is merely used as justification. This includes the Tory Party’s 
‘Go Home’  vans, the ‘hostile environment’  and Prevent, which have all been used as dog- 
whistle politics to appease far right voters, emboldening the extreme and far right and ignoring 
the impact this has had on immigrants, refugees and Muslims and the mainstreaming of certain 
discourses. In France, this is epitomised by the positioning of Islam and Muslim communities as 
the other to the concept of laïcité, increasingly understood in reactionary terms. The ban of the 
hijab in schools in 2004, the burqa in 2010 and more recently the burkini affair in 2016 have all 
entrenched ideas which were once found on the margins, within the extreme right. In the US, it 
took Trump’s rhetoric about Muslims and Mexicans in the campaign (and eventually office) to 
bring the extreme and far right in from the cold of the post-civil rights era, but he did not do this 
alone. It took the influence of Breitbart editor and later Trump advisor Steve Bannon, the 
emergent alt-right and alt-lite with their white identitarianism and social media savvy, and 
endorsements from Spencer, Duke and the wider racist extreme right. The mainstreaming 
process does not only take place through far right and politicians’ actions, but the mainstream 
media and academics have also played a key role in normalising and legitimising liberal 
Islamophobia and the notion that the ‘people’ or ‘white working class’ are in revolt against  
immigration  and  Islam in the UK,  US and France,  and more  widely,  in  ways  that make these 
politics appear democratic as opposed to extreme right (see Mondon and Winter 2018, 2019). 
What is worth noting is that the mainstreaming process that was founded upon the liberal turn 
emboldened fascists and white supremacists (and in some cases allowed them back in the fold), 
but also racist and authoritarian policies from liberal states that used to define themselves in 
opposition to racist, extremist movements. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature, definitions and debates about racist 
movements, particularly focused on the ways in which racism is constructed, ignored or 
displaced within these. We also offer an analysis of the ways in which racist movements 
(particularly historical manifestations) have stood in for racism in the post-war and later post-
racial contexts. We argue that this has made it more difficult to see racism in its deeper, more 
entrenched systemic forms, but also to understand how such movements have adapted, 
transformed and mainstreamed, and undergone a resurgence in both liberal and more 
traditional fascist forms. As a number of parties and movements have reached the gates of 
power, whether themselves as in the case of the FPÖ in Austria and the Lega in Italy by means of 
coalition, or through infiltration and radicalisation as was the case for Trump and Orban in 
Hungary, understanding the role of racism and its impact in our societies is urgent. To do this, it 
is essential that we move beyond the impact and actions of these parties and movements, but 
also engage with the role of mainstream actors in the hype and normalisation of certain 
discourses. Without such a holistic approach, we believe that any victory against the rise of the 
far right and continuation of racism as a structural and systemic issue will be shortlived. 
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